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7 Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to construct high-frequency composite indica-
tors of financial stress for Croatia that will enable the monitoring of the total 
level of financial stress and its components on the domestic financial market. Em-
phasis is put on the choice of variables appropriate for small, open, highly eu-
roized economies characterised by bank-centric financial systems dominantly 
owned by foreign banks, shallow financial markets and dependence on foreign 
capital. 
Keywords: financial stress, financial stability, financial markets, systemic risk, 
composite index, Croatia
1 INTRODUCTION
Many research papers refer to the strong and negative relation between stress epi-
sodes on the financial markets and financial and macroeconomic stability, and 
emphasize their adverse impact on overall economic activity (Hubrich and Tetlow, 
2012; Kliesen et al., 2012). In developing an analytical framework for monitoring 
financial markets, the objective is to encompass all of the most important stress 
sources that might cause the materialization of systemic risks. For this purpose, 
individual indicators could be used. Nevertheless, in order to reduce the volume 
of data from financial markets, while obtaining information about the total level 
of stress in the financial system, these indicators are often aggregated into com-
posite indices. The stronger the initial shock, the higher the correlation among the 
different segments of the financial system. This makes the use of aggregated data, 
reflecting developments in various segments of the financial system, the starting 
point for an analysis of financial stress and systemic risk (Kota and Saqe, 2013).
The main goal of this paper is to construct high-frequency financial stress indica-
tors for Croatia, which will enable the monitoring of the level of overall financial 
stress in the domestic financial system, as well as in particular segments of the fi-
nancial market, and which will provide timely indication of possible stress epi-
sodes and systemic risks materialization. In addition to the analysis of stress peri-
ods, there is an emphasis on the importance of information that indices can pro-
vide in tranquil periods on the financial markets.
In a review paper about the measurement of financial stress, Kliesen et al. (2012) 
show that most of the composite financial stress indicators are constructed for 
highly developed financial markets with diversified financial instruments and nu-
merous financial indicators. However, by adjusting the set of variables included in 
the index, they can also be useful for the analysis of developments in less devel-
oped financial systems. The main focus of this paper is thus not on development 
of a methodology for computing composite indices, but on the identification of 
variables that reflect financial stress in small, open, highly-euroized economies, 
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73low financial markets and dependence on foreign capital because of het shortfall 
in domestic savings. Apart from that, the focus is on the transmission mechanism 
of financial market shocks to these countries. Particular attention is directed to 
cases in which the main transmission channel of monetary policy is the exchange 
rate, and in which there is no classical reference interest rate. In such situations, 
the domestic money market is not necessarily a relevant source of bank funding, 
and the interest rates in this market segment have a negligible impact on the bor-
rowing costs for domestic sectors as they depend on trends in world financial 
markets and levels of risk premiums for the country and the parent banks of do-
mestic banks. Therefore, the analysis of variables that reflect financial stress in a 
small open economy is the most important contribution of this paper. Its practical 
contribution inheres in the potential use of the FSIs for economic policy makers 
and financial market participants. 
The paper is divided into five main parts. After an introduction there is a detailed 
explanation of the theoretical concept of financial stress, and the specific features 
of stress episodes are described, together with the channels through which they 
can influence financial and macroeconomic instability from the perspective of a 
small, open and highly euroized economy. The third section presents the problems 
involved in constructing FSIs, and a review of the methods of aggregating indi-
vidual indicators into a composite index is given. Part four explains the variables 
assessed as being appropriate for the construction of the FSIs for Croatia, consid-
ering the characteristics of the financial system, and the country’s economic and 
monetary characteristics. In order to check the robustness of the results, the indi-
ces are calculated by three methods. The main trends in financial stress in the pe-
riod from early 00 to the end of 03 are also described, as well as the stress 
episodes identified by the Markov switching model. The final part briefly sum-
marizes the main results and contributions of this paper.
2  FINANCIAL STRESS AND THE CHANNELS THROUGH WHICH  
IT AFFECTS FINANCIAL AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
There is no universally accepted definition of financial stress. Dufrénot et al. 
(0) describe it as a situation in which there is an enhanced probability of tur-
bulence in the financial markets accompanied with a currency or balance of pay-
ments crisis, a sudden stop in capital inflows or capital outflows, stock market 
crashes or the inability of a government to meet its liabilities. Holló (0) con-
siders financial stress as disturbances in the financial system that unexpectedly 
affect the price and turnover of financial instruments, which can be accompanied 
by the collapse of systemically important financial institutions and the inability of 
the financial system to carry out its main role and allocate financial resources, re-
sulting in a considerable economic slowdown. It can be concluded that financial 
stress implies disturbances in the normal functioning of financial markets and in 
the process of financial intermediation that can spill over onto the real sector 






































































39 (2) 171-203 (2015)
74 Although all stress episodes have their own specific features, Sinenko et al. (2012) 
accentuate their common attributes, such as increased uncertainty related to the 
value of financial assets and to the expectations of future economic developments, 
high expected financial losses, increased risk aversion and the general tendency of 
investors to keep less risky and more liquid financial assets. All of this increases 
the instability and volatility of prices on financial markets and results in rising risk 
premiums. Therefore, apart from the level, as a measure of financial stress the 
volatility of given variables is also often used. 
Financial stress is an inherent characteristic of a financial system. However, even 
when it is not high, such information should not be neglected. Sinenko et al. (2012) 
emphasize that prolonged periods of relatively low financial stress compared to 
the long-term average have often been accompanied by an exaggerated optimism 
on the part of market participants. This has resulted in excessive credit activity, a 
rise in the prices of different asset classes and the accumulation of macroeco-
nomic imbalances due to increased current account deficits and external debt. All 
of this has increased risks to financial stability. If disturbances indicated by high-
frequency indicators endure, there is a great probability that they will shortly af-
fect low-frequency indicators through financial or trade channels. 
Increased instability on financial markets usually results in higher risk aversion, 
causing a rise in risk premiums and in the financing costs of domestic sectors. If 
combined with reduced liquidity or even completely frozen financial markets, this 
may result in the strong slowdown of capital flows. The research has shown that 
emerging markets are more affected by this than developed countries because of 
their increased vulnerability to potential sudden changes in capital flows (Catao, 
006). 
Financial institutions’ interlinkages are also an important source of financial stress. 
In most European countries banks are the most important financial intermediaries, 
and their exposure to financial stress can result in high macroeconomic costs 
(Schou-Zibell et al., 2010). Because of their role, problems induced by the finan-
cial stresses that they have can rapidly spill over to other segments of the financial 
system, such as the interbank money market or the payments system. The links 
among financial institutions in the money market present potential channels for 
the rapid spillover of risks and difficulties among financial institutions in a short 
period. The speed of this process is proportional to the level of uncertainty and 
information asymmetry. 
An enhanced level of uncertainty related to financial stress can reduce the banks’ 
willingness to make loans. This motivates them to tighten their lending standards, 
which reduces the demand for loans as borrowers might postpone or give up on 
investments (Hubrich and Tetlow, 2011). In less developed financial systems the 
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75oped countries, in which the securities market is a noteworthy source of funding. 
This makes the influence of financial stress on loan conditions and the loan supply 
via this channel much more important for developing countries. 
In dominantly foreign owned banking systems, the parent banks of domestic 
banks represent an important transmission channel of financial stress from inter-
national to domestic financial markets. Parent banks’ problems measured in their 
increased risk premium affect not only the funding costs for their subsidiaries, but 
also their strategy related to the operations of the subsidiary banks. This can 
strongly influence credit activity and real economic developments in the countries 
where they have large exposures. Balakrishnan et al. (2009) confirm that the most 
pronounced channel for the transmission of financial stress to European emerging 
markets during the recent crisis was through the western European banks. 
In highly euroized countries, one of the most important channels for possible sp-
illovers of financial stress onto financial and macroeconomic indicators is the ex-
change rate. In such cases a significant part of the economy is exposed to a cur-
rency-induced credit risk deriving from the currency mismatches in debtors’ as-
sets and liabilities. If a strong depreciation of the domestic currency occurs, there 
is an increased likelihood of a considerable deterioration of the loan quality. In 
these countries, the main monetary policy transmission channel usually is not the 
interest rate, but the exchange rate. Therefore, the information contained in move-
ments in domestic interest rates differs from those on developed markets, in which 
the interest rate transmission channel is functioning. In addition to that, in some 
banking systems that are dominantly foreign owned and that are reliant on parent 
bank funding, domestic money market interest rates can have an almost negligible 
impact on the cost of domestic sector borrowing. This cost primarily depends on 
the perception of the country risk and parent banks’ risks, as well as on the liqui-
dity of international financial markets. 
3 THE CONSTRUCTION OF A COMPOSITE INDEX
Specific features of small open economies with shallow financial markets and lack 
of indicators used for the calculations of FSIs for developed countries imply a 
great challenge in the choice of variables reflecting financial stress. According to 
the literature, the most important potential sources of stress are the credit market, 
foreign exchange market, inter-bank money market and capital market (Oet et al., 
2011; Jakubik and Slačik, 2013). In addition to domestic data, due to the increased 
liberalization of financial flows and the fact that in most countries movements on 
the domestic financial market are heavily dependent on international develop-
ments, data from foreign financial markets are also used. But, even if the created 
indicators cover at a given moment all important potential sources of financial 
stress, it is necessary continuously to re-examine the appropriateness of the set of 
selected variables and to adjust it to the development of and trends in the financial 
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76 comparable, but they can provide useful information about the financial stress 
dynamics in different markets. Kliesen et al. (2012) present a detailed review of 
indicators and methods used for the construction of FSIs, while Jakubik and Slačik 
(2013) provide a useful example of the construction of financial instability indices 
for CEE countries, including Croatia.
In the literature about early warning systems, use is often made of binary methods, 
in which tranquil periods are marked with a zero and a crisis period with a one. 
But in the construction of the FSIs, the objective is to create a continuous measure 
that will show the level and the development of financial stress (Balakrishnan et 
al., 2011). Financial markets’ conditions are never either absolutely good or abso-
lutely bad, as might be concluded according to binary indicators, and they should 
be observed relatively over a period of time (Oet et al., 2011). Therefore, Illing 
and Liu (2006) observe financial stress through a continuous variable, where ex-
treme values mark a crisis episode. Such an approach emphasizes the index dy-
namics, rather than precise definitions of the beginning or end of a crisis episode. 
Commonly used methods for aggregating individual indicators into a composite 
index include aggregation via variance-equal weights, principal component analy-
sis, aggregation with the use of variance-equal or chained weights of variables 
transformed with the use of the empirical cumulative distribution function and 
aggregation in which the shares of given markets in the total financing of the 
economy are used as weights (Jakubik and Slačik, 2013; Illing and Liu, 2003; 
Sinenko et al., 2012;  Puddu, 2008; Holló, 2012).
Although similar results are obtained irrespective of the method used, each one of 
them has certain drawbacks. The shortcoming of variance-equal weights aggrega-
tion derives from the initial assumption that all the variables included in the index 
are equally important. In this manner, greater importance is given to those market 
segments represented in the index with more variables (Puddu, 2008). On the 
other hand, weighting based on a single component in factor analysis results in a 
fixed set of weights for the whole analysed period (Oet et al., 2011). In the trans-
formation of variables with the cumulative distribution function the assumption is 
that the gap between neighbouring variables is equal, which is usually not the 
case, because during long stable periods the relatively small volatility of the orig-
inal variables can seem greater after transformation than it actually is (OeNB, 
03). At the same time, the weights determined by all of these three methods 
have no economic significance, unlike the method where shares of individual mar-
kets in total loans in the economy calculated by aggregating bank loans, corporate 
and government bonds and shares are used as weights (Illing and Liu, 003). The 
potential use of the latter approach is relatively limited in less developed coun-
tries. Hence, for calculating the FSIs for Croatia the first three methods are used. 
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773.1 WEIGHTING BASED ON vARIANCE-EqUAL WEIGHTS (FSI_vEW)
Weighting based on variance-equal weights is the most often used method for the 
calculation of composite indices (Kliesen et al., 0). It implies the aggregation 




in which k is the number of variables included in the index,  is the sample arith-
metic mean for the variable Xi and σi is the sample standard deviation for the vari-
able Xi.
3.2  AGGREGATION OF vARIABLES TRANSFORMED BY THE CUMULATIvE 
DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION (FSI_CDF)
Every variable included in the index is initially transformed with the use of the 
cumulative distribution function. The greatest value of a given variable has the 
highest rank and indicates the greatest degree of financial stress, while rank one 
refers to the lowest recorded value of the indicator (Oet, 2011). Values around the 
median correspond to the average level of stress. After the rank of every observa-
tion within the time series has been determined, the empirical cumulative distribu-





In this manner every observation is turned into the corresponding percentile of the 
cumulative distribution function and takes a value between 0 and 1. Following 
Sinenko et al. (2012), for the aggregation of transformed variables in the index, 
weights for every variable are determined as a share of the transformed variable in 
the sum of total transformed variables:
  
(3)
and the total index is obtained as:
 . (4)
3.3 PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS (FSI_PCA)
In practice, this method is used for easier interpretation of a large number of vari-
ables which are transformed into a smaller number of uncorrelated variables or 
principal components (Anh and Mägi, 2009). This technique reveals the main 
drivers behind data variation and the interlinkages between variables that are not 
necessarily obvious. The correlations of the variables in the groups identified are 
greater within the groups than among the groups. FSIs are determined as the first 
principal component that explains the greatest part of the joint movement of the 
variables used for the construction of the index:
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178 in which α is the weight vector (of the dimension number of individual variables 
x 1) and xt is the vector of the values of the indicator (of the dimension number of 
individual variables x 1) on the basis of which the indices are evaluated. The load-
ings determine the variables that have the greatest contribution to the explanation 
of the joint movement of all the components of the aggregated index (table A1). 
4 FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX FOR CROATIA
In choosing variables for FSI construction, the objective was to take into consid-
eration as many as possible of the relevant segments of the domestic and foreign 
financial systems that might affect the level of financial stress in Croatia. Focus has 
been put on the specific features of the domestic financial markets, the availability 
of high frequency data, the economic and monetary characteristics of the country 
and relevant developments in foreign financial markets that might affect the stabi-
lity of the domestic financial system. Daily data from 30 January 2001 to 18 De-
cember 2013 were used and risks were divided according to the stress origin – do-
mestic or foreign, and also according to market segments (table 1). Apart from such 
a division, the main difference compared to the financial instability indices con-
structed by Jakubik and Slačik (2013) is that these FSIs include more variables for 
each market segment, as well as additional market signals and sources of risks such 
as risks related to the mother banks, bid-ask spreads and country risk premiums. 
Due to the high degree of euroization and the fact that in Croatia the main transmis-
sion mechanism of monetary policy is the exchange rate, several variables that re-
flect developments on the domestic foreign exchange market were used. Regard-
less of the direction in which the exchange rate moves, the increased EUR/HRK 
bid-ask spread and its volatility indicate higher instability and uncertainty related 
to the behaviour of market participants and signals an increased stress level. The 
forward exchange rate is an indicator of market expectations about future move-
ments in the EUR/HRK exchange rate. Since this figure is not available for every 
day, particularly in the initial part of the observed period, the five-day moving aver-
age of this variable is used instead.
The index also includes the level of the weighted exchange rate of the kuna to the 
euro, the Swiss franc and the US dollar. Although the EUR/HRK exchange rate is 
the most important for the Croatian economy as the external debt and most of the 
loans of domestic banks are in euros or indexed to the euro, Swiss franc movements 
have become an important potential source of stress because of the strong credit 
activity in this currency from 2005 to 2008. In this way the impact of the CHF/
HRK exchange rate has also been covered. At the end of 2008, Swiss franc loans 
accounted for 16% of total loans, or 24% of all loans denominated in or indexed 
to a foreign currency (CNB, 0).
In spite of the importance of the exchange rate for financial stability and notwith-
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179market, which is also not a primary funding source for domestic banks, interest 
rate movements and their volatility can nevertheless indicate the (in)stability of 
the overall financial market. The dynamics and level of short-term interest rates in 
the observed period were primarily determined by the surpluses or deficits of 
banks’ kuna liquidity. Apart from the banks’ operations, the liquidity of the system 
depended on the CNB’s activities, which, when necessary, maintained the ex-
change rate stability by restricting kuna liquidity.
There are several overnight interest rates on domestic money market: the over-
night interest rate in interbank trading, the interest rate on the Zagreb Money 
Market (ZMM) and Zagreb Interbank Interest Rate (ZIBOR). For calculating the 
FSI, the interbank interest rates have been used for the period from September 
2002, while for the previous period the ZMM interest rates are used. The coeffi-
cient of correlation for these two series in the coinciding period exceeds 0.9, con-
firming this is a reliable time series for the price of overnight borrowing. The ad-
vantage of this variable over ZIBOR is that it is at this rate that transactions are 
really executed, while ZIBOR is based on the banks’ quotations which are not 
obligatory and do not necessarily represent the rate at which transactions are ex-
ecuted. Although ZIBOR largely tracks the movement of the interbank interest 
rates, it has not been perceived as the reference interest rate, which is confirmed 
by the CNB bank survey according to which the most important money market 
interest rate is the interbank interest rate (Ivičić et al., 2008).
The spread between interest rates for short-term and long-term maturities reflects 
the liquidity risk premium and is often used as an indicator of money market devel-
opments. Since trading in maturities longer than a week in the domestic money 
market is negligible and there are many days when such transactions are not exe-
cuted at all, it is not a reliable indicator for this market segment. In spite of this and 
the mentioned limitations of ZIBOR, the FSI includes the spread between the inter-
est rate on the three-month treasury bills of the Ministry of Finance (MF) and the 
three-month ZIBOR. For ZIBOR there is a daily series of quotations, while the 
interbank interest rates for a three month maturity are available only when such 
transactions are executed, which significantly reduces the number of observations. 
This spread is the most commonly used variable for FSI calculations as it indicates 
the liquidity of the system by measuring the short-term credit risk and the premium 
on risk-free government treasury bills (Kliesen et al., 2012; Illing and Lieu, 2006). 
When money market liquidity is reduced or there is an increased risk that banks are 
unable to repay their liabilities it is expected to increase (Cardarelli et al., 2009). 
Another money market liquidity indicator is the use of Lombard loans. These are 
overnight collateralized loans available to the banks every day up to the prescribed 
amount of the nominal value of MoF treasury bills, at an interest rate set by the 
CNB. They are granted at the bank’s request at the end of the working day. An 
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Table 1 
Variables used for the calculation of the FSI divided according to market 
segments
Financial market 




EUR/HRK bid ask 
spread













appreciation or depreciation  
of domestic currency
CNB
Exchange rate weighted 
according to 
commercial banks’ asset 
structure 





Level of O/N interbank 
interest rates Liquidity of banking system CNB






Volatility of turnover  
on overnight market
Uncertainty, information 




Spread between 3M 
MoF T-bills and 3M 
ZIBOR 




Problems with liquidity of 
some participants of financial 




Returns on CROBEX * 
(–1) and its volatility
Uncertainty and information 





Uncertainty and information 
asymmetry on bonds market
ZSE, author’s 
calculation
Croatian kuna – 
denominated 
government bond 
maturing in 2019,  
bid-ask spread
Measure of market liquidity, 






LIBOR – OIS spread
Uncertainty on global money 














The use of Lombard loans can indicate liquidity problems in individual banks, and 
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It is not very likely that developments in the domestic capital market will signifi-
cantly influence the overall financial stability, because it is still relatively underde-
veloped and is not significant funding source for domestic corporates. Neverthe-
less, enhanced volatility in the stock prices induced by the instability in other 
market segments or macroeconomic developments can indicate an increased de-
gree of risk and instability in the financial system. Hence the FSI includes return 
on Zagreb Stock Exchange index CROBEX and its volatility, since a fall in the 
prices of shares and their increased volatility can indicate stress in this market 
segment. Return on CROBEX is calculated as the annual change in the index 
multiplied by minus one so that a fall in the price of shares indicates an increased 
financial stress (Balakrishnan et al., 2009).
The domestic debt securities market is characterized by low liquidity where gov-
ernment bonds account for more than 90% of bond market capitalization. CRO-
BIS is a bond price index calculated on the basis of market capitalization calcu-
lated at the end of each trading day as average daily price weighted by the quan-
tity for all bonds included in the index and its volatility is included in the FSI. The 
FSI also includes the bid-ask spread for the kuna-denominated government bond 
maturing in 2019, which measures the liquidity risk. A low level of this spread 
characterizes liquid markets with low transaction costs (Holló, 2012).
From the variables representing the foreign financial markets, the index includes 
data from global money market, share prices and various forms of risk premiums 
calculated on the basis of data from the bond market, which affect the borrowing 
costs of domestic sectors. Particularly important for the domestic financial system 
is the liquidity of the euro money market as it affects the funding costs of parent 
Financial market 




Investor perception about risk 
of investing in Croatian 
government bonds, 
macroeconomic outlook of 
country
Bloomberg
CDS of parent banks  
of domestic banks 
weighted according to 
their share in banking 
sector assets
Stability of operations of parent 









Liquidity measure, reflects 




Measure of the expected short-
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182 banks. Developments in this market segment can have both direct and indirect 
impacts on the availability and price of borrowing for domestic sectors and capital 
flows. In the extreme case of market illiquidity, when there is a considerable fall 
in turnover and prices collapse beyond values justified by fundamentals, there is a 
large probability that domestic sectors’ funding will be considerably constrained 
or even made impossible.
The average daily interest rate on overnight unsecured loans in euros (EONIA) 
shows the liquidity of the euro interbank market, and partially reflects movements 
on world financial markets. Its increased volatility suggests an amplified level of 
instability as well as information asymmetry among market participants. The six-
month EURIBOR is among the most often used interest rates, as it represents the 
basis of the determination of many other interest rates. An increase in the spread 
between the six-month EURIBOR and EONIA implies an enhanced uncertainty 
level on the euro interbank market and an increase in liquidity risk premium. Al-
though levels of these rates do affect the borrowing costs of domestic sectors, they 
are not included in the FSI because their growth is not necessarily linked to an 
increased stress. They generally closely follow the ECB reference interest rate, 
which is used to influence all other interest rates and depends on economic activ-
ity, inflationary expectations and the developments in the eurozone financial sys-
tem.
The spread between LIBOR and the overnight index swap (OIS) measures the 
stress on the international money market. OIS is an interest contract swap that 
reflects the expected level of the Fed’s reference interest rate, as well as the risk 
and liquidity on the money market. Because of the importance of the money mar-
ket for the banks’ financing, as a measure of risk of interbank lending it also indi-
rectly measures the health of the banking system. An increased LIBOR-OIS spread 
implies that banks could profit by borrowing from the Fed and lending to other 
banks, which makes sense only in cases of a more pronounced increase in credit 
risk.
Because of the importance of the German capital market and the high correlation 
between Deutsche Boerse AG German Stock Index (DAX) and the CROBEX in 
the pre-crisis period, the VDAX index is used as variable reflecting movements on 
the European stock market. This indicator measures expected volatility of prices 
on the German stock market, and together with the Chicago Board Options Ex-
change Volatility Index (VIX), which measures the implicit volatility of prices of 
options on the S&P 500, it is often used as an indicator of risk aversion.
The J. P. Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) reflects the risk on invest-
ment in Croatian securities and measures the country’s risk premium. It is related 
not only to global risk appetite, but also to the specific features of the domestic 
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183vestor perception of the country’s macroeconomic perspective. A rise in this index 
reflects an increased level of financial stress and leads to a rise in domestic sectors’ 
borrowing costs.
Considering the importance of government borrowing on foreign financial mar-
kets, the index also includes the bid-ask spread for Croatian government eu-
robonds. In order to obtain long time series, the ten-year bond maturing in 2014 
was used. The influence of general liquidity risk on global markets is excluded by 
reducing the bid-ask spread for the German government bond with comparable 
maturity from this spread for Croatian government bond.
The risk premium for the parent banks of the largest domestic banks also consider-
ably impacts the domestic financing costs. It is calculated by aggregating the CDS 
premiums for bonds of five parent banks – Unicredit S.p.A., Intesa Sanpaolo 
S.p.A., Société Generale, Erste Group Bank and Raiffeisen Zentralbank. Weights 
used were the shares of each individual domestic bank in the total assets of these 
five banks. This premium directly affects the price of borrowing for parent banks, 
which in the next step spills over onto the funding price for the subsidiary banks, 
and in the third step affects the borrowing costs for other domestic sectors through 
increased lending interest rates. Difficulties in parent bank could also reduce their 
available sources for financing domestic banks.
4.1 THE MARkOv SWITCHING MODEL
Although this research is primarily focused on FSI dynamics, in order to calculate 
the contribution of individual market segments to stress episodes and enable a 
better analysis of monetary policy reactions, their dates are calculated with the use 
of the Markov switching model. Crisis episodes could have also been defined ex-
ogenously, for example, as a period in which the value of the index exceeds a 
certain number of standard deviations or some boundary value set on the basis of 
a well informed assessment. 
The Markov switching model is suitable if the data dynamics changes through 
time (Yuan, 2011; Kuan, 2002). This model endogenously finds the boundary val-
ues for the determination of a stress episode and divides the sample into periods 
of enhanced and reduced stress. It also determines the likelihood of a transition 
from one regime to another (Dufrénot et al., 2011). 
It is assumed there are two regimes with different FSI dynamics. In the standard 
Markov switching model with two states in which yt is the FSI at the moment t and 
the arithmetical mean and variance are described by an unobserved state variable 
 runs: 
  (7)






































































39 (2) 171-203 (2015)
184
where st is the current state of stress on the financial markets, μ1 and μ2 are the 
expectations, and σ1 and σ2 are standard deviations for the two regimes, while ε1 
represents white noise.
In this case st =1 can be seen as a steady state on the financial markets, while st =2 
designates a state of increased financial stress. It is assumed that this variable fol-
lows a Markov process with the following transition matrix:
where  designates the likelihood of a transition from one regime 
to another, that is, the probability that the process is at time t in regime j, with the 
assumption that it was previously in regime i, and that  (Yuan, 0).
Calculation of dates and contributions to the episodes of financial stress was based 
on FSI_vew as it enables a more intuitive interpretation of the contributions of the 
individual components to the movement of the total FSI (Sinenko et al., 2012).
4.2 RESULTS OF THE MODEL
The remainder of the paper presents indices obtained by different aggregation 
methods and describes the FSIs during the observed period, as well as the stress 
episodes and the CNB reactions related to financial market developments.
Independently of the aggregation method, the indices are strongly positively cor-
related and result in similar information about the stress episodes (table ). 
Table 2 
Coefficients of correlation between indices calculated by various methods
 IFS 1_vew IFS 2_pca IFS_3_cdf
IFS 1_vew  0.75 0.94
IFS 2_pca                0.70
IFS_3_cdf                
Note: Due to the smaller number of variables included in the FSI_pca it is not entirely compara-
ble with the other two indices, which partially explains the lower correlation among them. 
Source: Author’s calculation.
In order to additionally check the robustness of the results, FSI_vew and FSI_cdf 
are also calculated with the use of only those indicators included in the FSI_pca 
 FSIs_vew are presented in the text itself (figures 1, 2, 3 and 4), while FSI_cdf and FSI_pca are presented in 
appendix, as well as in figures A1 and A3. The list of variables included in the calculation of the FSI-vew and 
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185(table 3). The correlation coefficients show even greater positive correlation 
among the indices and confirm the robustness of the results.
Table 3 
Coefficients of correlation between indices calculated with the use of the same 
variables
 IFS 1_vew IFS 2_pca IFS_3_cdf
IFS 1_vew  0.94 0.88
IFS 2_pca                0.78
IFS_3_cdf                
Source: Author’s calculation.
Useful data about financial stress were obtained by a calculation of sub-indices. In 
the first step the total FSI was divided into components related to the origin of the 
shocks that might lead to financial stress (figure 2, table 1). The sub-index FSI-D, 
which describes trends in the domestic components of overall financial stress, in-
cludes variables from the foreign exchange market, the money market and the 
securities market. The sub-index FSI-F, which reflects movements on foreign fi-
nancial markets, includes indicators from the international money market and se-
curities markets that are considered to affect the financial stress in the country 
through various channels. 
In order to obtain more detailed information from individual market segments, 
sub-indices have been additionally divided into several components. The domes-
tic component FSI-D was divided into indices that describe the domestic foreign 
exchange market, money markets and securities market (FSI-D-FXM; FSI-D-
MM; FSI-D-SM – figure 3). In the same manner, the FSI-F was divided into sub-
indices for the international money market (FSI-F-MM) and the international se-
curities market (FSI-F-SM) (figure 4).
Following the financial and macroeconomic developments that tended to bring 
about financial stress in Croatia, the period under observation is divided into five 
sub-periods:
) from 00 to the end of 00,
2) from 2003 to end-2004,
3) from 2005 to mid-2007,
4) from mid-2007 to the beginning of 2010, and
5) from 2010 to end-2013.
These sub-periods, movements of total FSI and its components and the causes of 
identified stress episodes are described in the rest of the chapter. A comparison of 
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Domestic and foreign components of total FSI_vew
Source: Author’s calculation.
FSI – total
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187Figure 3 
FSIs divided according to market segments: domestic money market, domestic 



















































































 FSI – total      FSI-D-MM – domestic money market
 FSI – total      FSI-D-SM – domestic securities market
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Figure 5 shows the periods determined as episodes of increased turbulences on the 
financial markets for an FSI_vew according to the Markov switching model. In 
order to verify the robustness and to confirm if the stress episodes have been cor-
rectly identified, they were also determined with the use of the FSI_cdf (appendix, 
figure A2). The stress periods are very similar, implying the robustness of the re-
sults. Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed out that the main objective of the iden-
tification of stress episodes is the analysis of the underlying developments and the 
market participants’ reactions, rather than determining their precise dates. 
The contributions of individual market segments and of individual sources of risks 
to the stress episodes were calculated for all eight stress episodes (figures 6 and 7). 
To simplify this analysis, episodes that were shorter-lasting but frequent in time 
are observed as a single stress episode.
In the pre-crisis period up to the second half of 2008, there were five stress epi-
sodes. They were mostly affected by domestic financial market variables, but did 
Figure 4 































 FSI – total    FSI-F-MM – international money market
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Figure 5 
Episodes of increased turbulence on the financial markets determined by the 
Markov switching model






















































































































































































































7/01-12/01 3/02-5/02 6/03-4/0 7/04-2/05 9/07-2/08 9/08-1/10 7/11-11/12 6/13-9/13
Figure 6 
Contributions of individual FSI components to stress episodes: according to 
market segments (in %)
 FSI – total      Probability – right
not have pronounced systemic consequences. In the subsequent period, there were 
three stress episodes, two of which were extremely powerful not only for their 
intensity but also for their length, and for their strong negative impacts on the real 
economy. They were primarily initiated by shocks from international financial 
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4.2.1 First period: from 2001 to 2003
The total FSI in the period from 2001 to 2003 was relatively volatile, but there 
were only two, fairly mild, stress episodes. The first one is related with the 9/11 
attacks, which led to a rise in uncertainty and volatility on world financial markets 
and increased risk premiums. The FSI-F reveals that these turbulences were par-
tially transmitted to the domestic financial market via the money market channel 
(figures 1, 2 and 4, column 1). The total FSI in this period was mostly affected by 
a speculative attack on domestic currency (figures 1 and 2, column 1). In the mid-
dle of August 2001, depreciation pressures on the EUR/HRK exchange rate arose, 
showing up much earlier than would usually have been expected, considering the 
seasonal inflow of foreign capital from tourism. This was encouraged by the spec-
ulative activities of some banks that in expectation of a considerable kuna depre-
ciation started vigorously buying euros. In the shallow domestic market this ad-
ditionally enhanced depreciation pressures (figure 3, column 1). The central bank 
intervened three times in the period between 9 August and 20 August and sold 
EUR 408m to the banks, which halted the depreciation pressures. In this period, a 
strong rise in the money market interest rates was recorded (figure 2, column 1). 
This encouraged some banks to use Lombard loans that they, in spite of their high 
rate of interest, considered as favourable within the market expectations regarding 
the exchange rate, so the central bank increased the interest rate for Lombard 
loans from 9.5% to 10.5%. 
Figure 7 
Contributions of individual FSI components to stress episodes: according to 
sources and types of risk (in %)
Source: Author’s calculation.
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191The contributions calculated for this stress episode, which lasted from July to Decem-
ber 2001, confirm the importance of events and uncertainties on the foreign exchange 
market, and to a lesser extent of movements on the domestic money market, for the 
development of overall financial stress in the system (figures 6 and 7, column 1).
Domestic banking system liquidity in 2002 was relatively high and the year was 
marked by strong appreciation pressures due to large foreign capital inflows from 
tourism, enhanced foreign borrowing by the government and the commercial 
banks and the privatization of domestic enterprises. Through several foreign ex-
change interventions the CNB net created HRK4.8bn, which was partially steri-
lized by increasing the base for the kuna reserve requirement and by increased 
issuance of central bank T-bills. This ensured stability on the money and foreign 
exchange markets, which had been disrupted only for a short period due to the 
internal fraud in the treasury of Riječka banka (figure 3, column 2). The rapid 
CNB reaction ensured the necessary domestic and foreign currency liquidity for 
the normal operations of Riječka banka in the period until the new owner took it 
over, so this turbulence was only temporary and the crisis did not spill over to 
other financial institutions. This stress episode lasted from March to May 2002.
4.2.2 Second period: from 2003 to 2004
The period from early 2003 to the end of 2004 was marked by a relatively low 
level of financial stress. This was an introduction into a quite long period of low 
risk premiums and low volatility of international market indicators (figures 1, 2, 3 
and 4, column ).
Developments on the domestic financial market in 2003 were influenced by the 
tightening of the CNB’s policy aimed at slowing down the credit expansion and 
banks’ foreign borrowing. Sanctions were introduced on the growth of domestic 
loans greater than 16% a year or 4% quarterly and banks were obliged to hold the 
minimum required amount of foreign currency claims of 35% in order to ensure 
appropriate foreign currency liquidity. The latter measure resulted in depreciation 
pressures on the kuna because of the augmented demand for foreign exchange and 
a reduction in primary liquidity in the banking system, as well as in a surge in the 
level and volatility of money market interest rates in the second half-year (figures 
 and 3, column ).
In September 2003, the CNB increased the percentage of the reserve requirement 
on foreign currency obligations that must be held in kuna from 25% to 35%, and 
additionally to 4% in November 003. These changes resulted in temporary ap-
preciation pressures on the EUR/HRK exchange rate and increased volatility of 
money market interest rates (FSI-D-FXM; FSI-D-MM – figure 3, column 2). In 
February 2004, the minimum percentage of reserve requirements that were set 
aside in a special account at the CNB was increased from 40% to 60%; and by 
foreign exchange interventions the banking system liquidity was increased, which 
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192 The most important sources of stress in the third stress episode from June 003 to 
April 2004 were developments and uncertainty on the domestic foreign exchange 
and domestic money market (figures 6 and 7, column 3).
In July 004, interest rates surged again when the CNB imposed a marginal re-
serve requirement on an increase in foreign liabilities of banks, which was ini-
tially set at 24%, but has additionally been raised several times (figure 3, FSI-D-
MM, column 2). This resulted in considerable changes in banks’ liquidity and in 
oscillations of money market interest rates until early 2005. This strongly affected 
the FSI-D, particularly the FSI-D-MM (figures 2 and 3, column 2). Overnight in-
terest rates went up to as high as 10%, but after several foreign exchange interven-
tions they dropped to a relatively low %. The fourth stress episode lasted from 
July 2004 to February 2005 and was marked by developments on the domestic 
money market (figure 3, column 2; figures 6 and 7, column 4).
4.2.3 Third period: from 2005 to mid-2007
The third period was the longest period of low-level of financial stress in which 
there were no major turbulences in a single segment of the financial market and 
not a single stress episode was recorded (figures 1, 2, 3 and 4, column 3; figure 5). 
It was marked by high level of global liquidity, low risk appetite and the beginning 
of a gradual increase in reference interest rates by the Fed and the ECB prompted 
by exceptionally propitious economic trends. 
However, precisely in that period of benign market conditions a considerable de-
terioration in internal and external imbalances was recorded because of strong 
foreign borrowing, excessive credit activity and overheating of the domestic econ-
omy. Therefore, the CNB continued tightening its monetary, or rather macropru-
dential, policy. The marginal reserve requirement rate was gradually increased 
and reached 55% by the end of 2005. In early 2006, a special reserve requirement 
on newly issued bank debt securities, and increased capital requirements for cur-
rency-induced credit risk were introduced, the capital adequacy ratio was in-
creased to %, at the beginning of 007 the annual credit growth was restricted 
to 12%, and in 2008 capital requirements for banks with higher than permitted 
credit growth were increased. These measures increased the overall level of finan-
cial system resilience by creating buffers against possible shocks. But in spite of 
CNB efforts aimed at slowing down systemic risk accumulation, it was precisely 
in this period of calm and stable conditions on the financial markets that systemic 
risks significantly increased. These risks materialized during the following stress 
episodes.
4.2.4 Fourth period: from mid-2007 to end-2009
The beginning of the fourth period was also the onset of the world financial crisis. 
In the second half of 2007 the first difficulties associated with sub-prime mort-
gages in the USA appeared. When issuers of securities based on these loans faced 
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193onto the interbank money market and spread globally (FSI-F – figure 2, column 4; 
FSI-F-MM – figure 4, column 4). Initially, these developments only slightly af-
fected domestic FSIs (figures 1 and 2, column 4). The FSI-F increased, but its 
level was similar to the level recorded before the long-lasting tranquil period. It 
had stabilized at the beginning of 2008 and even started decreasing.
A much greater impact on the total FSI came from the increased volatility in the 
domestic money market caused by the IPO of the domestic telecom company T-
HT in October 2007 (figures 1, 2 and 3, column 4). At that time, an imbalance 
between money supply and demand arose as a small group of banks generated a 
considerable part of the demand for kuna, while participants with liquidity surplus 
required interest rates higher than usual. Although the system liquidity was at the 
usual level, the shallow money market had difficulties in adjusting to the large 
inflows or outflows of money, which contributed to the elevated interest rates 
levels and their increased volatility until the end of the year (figure 3, FSI-D-MM, 
column 4).
The fifth identified stress episode lasted from September 2007 to February 2008 
and was mostly attributable to uncertainty and volatility on the domestic and in-
ternational money markets due to the increased credit risk and the fall in confi-
dence among market participants (figures 6 and 7, column 5).
Temporary stabilization on the international financial markets lasted until March 
2008 and the collapse of the investment bank Bear Stearns. Although this crisis 
situation was solved promptly and there were no significant negative consequences 
for the rest of the financial system as the failed bank was taken over by the J. P. 
Morgan, the reduced confidence among market participants stimulated a new surge 
in volatility and nervousness on the international money market (figure 4, column 
4). In spite of that, the influence of the FSI-F and FSI-F-MM on total FSI was not 
significant (figures 1 and 2, column 4). After the initial rise, the FSI-F did not change 
much until the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 (figures 2 and 4, 
column 4). This resulted in a previously unrecorded rise in global risk aversion and 
an increase in price volatility with a simultaneous plunge in liquidity and a rise in 
distrust among market participants. Therefore, both components of the FSI-F surged 
(figures 2 and 4, column 4). A sudden jump in the Croatian risk premium and a 
frozen international money market hindered the access of domestic sectors to for-
eign capital, which was reflected in all segments of the FSI-D (figure 3, column 4).
In the fourth quarter of 2008, level and volatility of overnight interest rates rose 
considerably, and in November 2011 the FSI-D-MM reached a record level (figure 
3, FSI-D-MM, column 4). This was induced by transactions on the capital market 
related to the takeover of INA d.d. by Hungary’s MOL. This led to a division of 
banks into those with considerable surpluses and those with notable liquidity def-
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194 bility on world financial markets resulted in a partial withdrawal of bank deposits 
in October 2008. Banks were encouraged to retain more liquid assets, which in-
creased the demand for foreign currency liquidity (figure 3, FSI-D-FXM, column 
4). In order to maintain overall financial stability, the CNB was forced to restrict 
kuna liquidity (figure 3, FSI-D-MM, column 4). The CNB started releasing previ-
ously accumulated reserves and the first step was the abolition of the marginal 
reserve requirement in October 2008, which improved foreign currency liquidity 
in the banks and ensured the payment of international liabilities. This resulted in 
the preservation of a stable exchange rate and high level of international reserves, 
as well as in the highest recorded short-term money market interest rates. Due to 
the restricted kuna liquidity, the pressures on the foreign exchange market were 
reflected on the money market (FSI-D-MM), so in the initial phase of the escala-
tion of the crisis it was only slightly reflected in the developments of the FSI-D-
FXM (figure 3, column 4). 
Instability on the money market at the end of the year and efforts to make it easier 
for government to finance within the country led in December 2008 to the lower-
ing of the reserve requirement rate from 17% to 14%. System liquidity was im-
proved and interest rates decreased noticeably. This was reflected in a considera-
ble, but temporary, reduction of FSI-D-MM (figure 3, column 4). As well as 
through reverse repo auctions, banks obtained kuna liquidity by the intensive use 
of Lombard loans, even though their interest rate had increased from 7.5% to 
9.0% and the regulations concerning the amount of securities needed as collateral 
had been strengthened.
The first half of 2009 was influenced by global turbulences, frozen international 
money markets and a sudden stop in capital flows. Due to renewed depreciation 
pressures, in the first quarter of 2009 the CNB intervened three times in the for-
eign exchange market, at the first two auctions selling and, in the last auction at 
the end of February, buying euros. In this period a marked increase in the FSI-D-
FXM was recorded (figure 3, column 4). In order to stabilize the exchange rate, in 
January 2009 the CNB increased the percentage of the foreign currency reserve 
requirement set aside in kuna from 50% to 75%, and in order to ensure adequate 
foreign liquidity of the system in February the rate of minimum foreign currency 
claims was reduced from 28.5% to 20%.
The developments on the foreign exchange market resulted in the first quarter of 
2009 in a temporary, but a significant rise in the level and volatility of overnight 
interest rates and increased turnover in the money market because of the lower kuna 
liquidity (figure 3, FSI-D-MM, column 4). This stabilized at the end of February 
after the weakening of depreciation pressures, and both interest rates and volatility 
on the money market were reduced (figure 3, FSI-D-MM, FSI-D-FXM, column 4). 
By the end of the year, banking sector liquidity was satisfactory and the interest 
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195The end of 2008 and most of 2009 were marked by a major decline in the CROBEX 
and increased volatility of returns on both CROBEX and CROBIS, which were 
strongly reflected in the FSI-D-SM (figure 3, column 4).
Unlike previous stress episodes, when some market segments alleviated stress 
disruptions, in the sixth episode from September 2008 to January 2010 all of them 
contributed to the increase of financial stress (figures 6 and 7, column 6). The 
greatest influence on these movements was made by the events on the interna-
tional and domestic money markets. Since the stabilization of the EUR/HRK ex-
change rate was a key precondition for the preservation of overall financial stabil-
ity in the country, interest rates on the domestic money market were, at that time, 
“sacrificed” in order to achieve that goal. 
4.2.5 Fifth period: from the beginning of 2010 to end-2013
In the fifth period, the crisis in the government debt market in peripheral eurozone 
countries deepened in mid-2011. Apart from threatening banking sector stability, 
this crisis adversely affected the expectations of market participants, consumers 
and corporate sector related to the economic recovery. The renewed decline in 
investor risk appetite increased risk premiums, and stress spilled over onto the 
domestic financial system through a rise in the FSI-F (figures 1, 2 and 4, column 
5). The risk premium for Croatia rose, absolutely and relatively, much more than 
the premiums for European emerging markets, and exceeded the record level 
reached in early 2009. These developments considerable enlarged the FSI-F-SM 
(figure 4, column 5).
The increased reliance of subsidiaries on their parent banks during the fifth stress 
episode reflected a support of the owners to domestic banks, but also increased ex-
posure to parent banks’ liquidity, their needs for capital, financing strategies and to 
developments in their home countries, as well as in those in which they had consid-
erable exposures. The worsening of the international debt market conditions in the 
second half of 2011 led to a rise in the CDS premiums on the bonds of the parent 
banks of the five largest domestic banks. Their average level at the end of 2011 
ranged about 500 basis points, almost twice as much as in the period after the esca-
lation of the crisis, primarily because of the exposures to peripheral eurozone coun-
tries and concerns regarding the sustainability of their fiscal positions. Adverse de-
velopments in CDS premiums for Italy additionally increased the risk perception of 
Italian parent banks compared to those from Austria or France. This resulted in the 
partial withdrawal of the parent banks’ funding from domestic banks and increased 
pressures on the foreign currency liquidity (figures 3 and 4, column 5). 
During the seventh stress episode from July 0 to November 0 the major 
contribution to movement of total FSI and the increased level of stress came from 
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196 growth of uncertainty and risk aversion observed in an increase of FSI-F (figures 
1, 2 and 4, column 5; figures 6 and 7, column 7).
In spite of the negative macroeconomic trends in 2013 and the fall in the country’s 
credit rating, the EUR/HRK exchange rate remained stable, the liquidity of the 
system was high due to the CNB measures and the money market interest rates 
were low and stable. Components of FSI-D were quite low and decreased through-
out the year (figures 2 and 3, column 5).
The eighth stress episode lasted from mid-June to September 2013 and was driven 
by the cost of foreign borrowing, particularly trends in the international securities 
markets which assessed Croatia as a rather risky investment. This period was 
characterized by the Croatian credit rating downgrade to below investment level 
by all three major agencies (Standard and Poor’s, 13 December 2012; Moody’s, 1 
February 2013; and Fitch Ratings, 20 September 2013). Notwithstanding this and 
the lack of economic recovery, Croatia still had access to the financial markets. 
The total FSI reacted relatively strongly to the first downgrade, while the negative 
reactions to the two further credit downgrades were somewhat milder (figure 1, 
column 50). Such moderate reactions were partially caused by the stabilization on 
the international financial markets. Government took advantage of favourable cir-
cumstances and issued two new bonds in the USA (in April, USD 1.5bn, yield at 
issue of 5.62%; November, USD 1.75bn, yield at issue of 6.20%). 
The end of the period was marked by improved world financial market conditions 
and a fall in general risk aversion (figure 4, column 5). Nevertheless, the Croatian 
risk premium remained elevated and FSI-F negatively contributed to the total FSI 
(figure 2, column 5). The reason for this were investors’ concerns regarding the 
lack of economic recovery, deterioration of fiscal indicators and absence of struc-
tural reforms that would create conditions for sustainable economic growth. Due 
to its inherent weaknesses, Croatia did not use the period of stable and unexpect-
edly favourable conditions in the domestic and international financial markets to 
ensure cheaper funding for the private sector, which would have been an impor-
tant step towards economic recovery. Croatia therefore remained extremely vul-
nerable to any possible tightening of financial conditions, meaning that in the 
event of a more pronounced increase in risk aversion it could face a prohibitively 
high price of foreign capital.
4.3 COMPARISON OF FSIs AND INDICES OF FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
Following Kliesen (2012) and in order to additionally check the robustness and 
usefulness of the results obtained, total FSI was compared with the financial con-
ditions index (FCI) for Croatia. FCI is calculated by using the principal compo-
nent analysis, on the basis of 28 macroeconomic and financial variables that re-
flect financing conditions in Croatia (for details see Dumičić and Krznar, 2013). 
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197The coefficients of correlation imply a strong positive link between FCI and FSIs 
calculated by various methods. This correlation is even stronger if the level of the 
FSI of the previous quarter is used, suggesting a great influence of financial stress 
on overall financial conditions and the possible use of the FSI for predicting trends 
in financing conditions for domestic sectors in the forthcoming period. 
Figure 8 
Comparison of total FSI with FCI
Source: Author’s calculation (FCI is calculated on the basis of the data and methodology pre-
sented in Dumičić and Krznar, 2013).
Table 4 
Coefficients of correlation between FCIs and FSIs






Due to the adverse effects that financial market stress episodes have on financial 
and macroeconomic stability, the main objective of this paper has been to con-
struct high-frequency financial stress indicators that will in good time inform eco-
nomic policy makers of possible disruptions in the financial markets and be a 
useful tool for the analysis of risks that might jeopardize the financial and macro-
economic stability of the system. Another objective was to use the Croatian exam-
ple to create an index that, in spite of the relatively limited accessibility of daily 
data, would still cover the most important specific features of a small, open, highly-
euroized country with shallow financial markets and majority foreign-owned 
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198 banks. Namely, most of the financial stress indicators were created for developed 
countries that are at a different level of economic and financial development and 
are characterized by institutional and regulatory arrangements different from those 
in emerging markets. Special attention has been devoted to the particular channels 
through which financial stress spills over from the financial markets to other seg-
ments of the financial system and the real sector in such countries. The identifica-
tion of sources of financial stress and the factors that affect them, the understand-
ing of the channels through which disruptions spill over to the remainder of the 
financial system and real sector, as well as the analysis of the policy makers’ ac-
tivities in these periods can enable more effective preventive actions and better 
reactions in stress episodes.
For the aggregation of individual indicators into a composite index, three methods 
were used – aggregation with the use of weightings based on equal-weight vari-
ances, aggregation of variables transformed with the use of the cumulative distri-
bution function, and the principal component analysis. The indices constructed are 
highly correlated, which means that the aggregation method does not essentially 
affect the information contained in the index, confirming the robustness of the 
results. The Croatian example shows that the calculated FSIs present a useful tool 
for describing events on the financial markets as well as monetary and macroeco-
nomic trends, also suggesting the robustness of results. 
By analysing the FSIs and the CNB reactions to the observed financial stress epi-
sodes, it can be concluded that the CNB was successful in the stabilization of the 
financial markets and the preservation of overall financial stability. Although FSIs 
did not exist in the observed period, they could have been useful in the process of 
identifying sources of stress disruptions, particularly in communication with pub-
lic and market participants when explaining the preventive measures. Market par-
ticipants and the public were often unaware of the possible threats to threatening 
financial stability, particularly during the stable periods on the financial markets.
It can be expected that these indicators will continue to be developed and that their 
components will adjust to financial markets’ developments. In the next step, the 
indices might be used as an early warning tool for predicting trends in the financ-
ing conditions for domestic sectors or forecasting real economic developments 
(i.e. like Jakubik and Slačik, 2013). In combination with other techniques, like 
stress testing, various systems of early warning, and other composite indicators 
created for the analysis of financial stability in Croatia, such as FCI or indices of 
the accumulation and materialization of systemic risks, this indicator should ena-
ble a better monitoring of risks and ensure a prompt reaction of economic policy 
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199APPENDIX 
Indices of financial stress calculated with the use of variables transformed 
with the cumulative distribution function 
Figure A1 






























































































































































































































































Episodes of increased turbulence on the financial markets determined by the 
Markov switching model
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00 Financial stress indices calculated with the principal component analysis 
method
Figure a3 





























Note: Number of variables included in the FSI obtained by the PCA method is smaller than in 
indices calculated by other methods because not all data are available since January 2001 and 
the exclusion of non-stationary variables. The usual methods of transforming variables with daily 
frequency to avoid this problem result in very volatile series. 
Source: Author’s calculation.
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0Table a1 
Loadings of parameters for variables included in the FSI_pca 
variables/Index FSI_pca_total FSI_pca_domestic FSI_pca_foreign
Returns on CROBEX 0.45 0.3
Volatility of overnight 
interbank interest rates
0.0 0.3
Exchange rate weighted 
according to banks’ assets 
structure
0.09 0.68
Forward exchange rates 0.5 0.69
CDS of parent banks of 
domestic banks weighted 
according to their share in 
banking sector assets
0.50 0.57
EMBI risk premium  
for Croatia
0.55 0.6
EONIA volatility 0.28 0.34
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